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Toward a Levcls Vcrsion of the Rotterdam
and Rclated Demand Systems
Anton P. Barten
13.1 Introduction
The theory of demand for the individual consumer implies a set of prop-
erties (constraints) on the elasticities of demand with respect to income
(or total expenditure) and prices. For at least two reasons it is dcsirable to
take these properties into account in empirical work: The Grst is the
reduction in the number of independent coefficients to be estimated. The
second is the ability to obtain predictions with estimated versions of the
dcmand relations that make sense from a theoretical point of view. This
last possibility is attractive also if one works with data for the whole
economy rather than for a single consumer. fndeed, without the fiction of
the representative consumer, it is difficult to give any meaning to empirical
results for an aggregate of consumers.
Besides the homogeneity condition the constraints on the elasticities
pertain to more than one demand function at a time. To take the con-
straints into account in a proper way, one has to formulate and estimate a
complete system of demand equations, which in principle describes how
the consumer allocates his budget over all desirable goods and services.
The Theil (1965) formulation of what is known as the Rotterdam demand
system amounts to a convenient and simple transformation of demand
elasticitics into constants that satisfy, or can be made to satisfy, the
theoretical constraints. They can be directly estimated. Of course, the
Rotterdam system is not the only demand system that (1) can or does
incorporate constraints from theory, (2) is relatively easy to estimate and
interpret, and (3) is potentially (lexible (i.e., allows for nontrivial interac-
tions among commodities, such as specific substitution or complemen-
tarity). Still, the Rotterdam system is not a priori dominated by any other
system, and it is therefore useful to increase its applicability.
Indeed, as originally formulated, the Rotterdam specification applies to
a systcm in terms of the logarithmic first differences in quantities, priccs,
and incomes. This limits its practical use to the analysis of time series data.
Even for that type of data more refined dynamics are diflicult to capture
using first differences of the major determinants. Moreover there are cross
sections of observations with (sometimes imputed) price variation, which
can only be meaningfully handled by a system in terms of the levcls of the
variablcs. Such a system with a Rotterdam-type parametrization appears
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to be a uscful tool for demand analysis. It is the purpose of this chapter to
present such a system.
The first-difference version of the Rotterdam system is one of a class of
systems to which the almost ideat demand system (AIDS) of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980)-in lirst differences-and the CBS demand system of
Keller and Van Driel (l985) also belong. For the (evels version of the
Rotterdam system, a similar class can be formulated. The counterpart of
the AIDS first-difference equation in this class is not quite the same as the
Ievels version of AIDS proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer, although its
parametrization is the same.
It is useful to start with a presentation of the constraints on the elasticities
which are derived from demand theory. This is the topic of section 13.2.
Section l 3.3 takes up the case of convenient parametrization in systems in
terms ofGrst differences. We then turn to a discussion of the choice of levels
versions for these systems. Alternative approaches are also considered.
Such systems are used to generate information about quantities demanded,
expenditure shares, and the like. For some of these systems, such simulation
is not trivial, as is shown in section 13.6. Some insight about the relative
merits of the various systems can be gaincd from an empirical application,
which one finds in section 13.7. The last section is devoted to concluding
remarks.
13.2 Constraints on Elasticitics
As a starting point we use the double-logarithmic demand function
In y; - x; t ry; In m t~ {c;; In p~, i,j- l, ., n, l l)
where c. is the ositive uantit of ood i and its (positive) price, and1~ (P ) 9 Y g P~
m is total expcnditure defined as
m - ~ p~yl. (2)
i
Thc q; are income or expc:nditure elasticities; the p;; are the price elasticities.
Tticrc is no fundamental reason why these elasticities are constant (i.e.,
indcpendcnt of m and the p;). The same is true for the intercept a;.
Frisch ( 1959) states a sct of properties that the ry; and the ~;; shouW satisfy
if thcy are to re(]ect utility-maximizing behavior. These properties involve
the budget shares, w;, defined as
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P~9rw; - - ,m
that is, the share otexpenditure on good i in total expenditure. Clearly
~w,-l.
The first set of properties are those of adding-up:
(3)
(4)
~ ~v;ry; - 1 (Engcl aggregation), (5)
~ ~~;{r;i - -wi (Cournot aggregation). (6)
These properties guarantee that explained demand satisfies the budget
identity (2). Next is the homoyeneiry condition:
~ {r;j - - I];, (~l
which is derived from the linear homogeneity in rn and the p; of the budget
idcntity (2).
Further propcrties can be conveniently formulated in terms of the Slut-
sk}~ or compensated price elasticity, defined as
e;i - {r;i ~- rlr~~~, (8)
which rellects the substitution effect of price changes, with utility kept
constant. Note that adding-up conditions ( 5) and (6) imply an adding-up
condition for the Slutsky elasticitics,
~ w;e;i - ~ w;N;i f ~ w;r{iwi - -wi -~ wi - 0 ( Slutsky aggregation),
~ ~ ~
~vhile it follows from homogeneity condition ( 7) and from (4) that
~c;i-~{r;i f rl;~ wi- - qi f nr -0
i i i
wliich is thc homogencity condition for the Slutsky elasticities.
An additional property is that of Slutsky symmerry:
w; r;i - xjE;;. ( t 1)
Thc nrgurir~ity propcrty (not mentioncd by Frisch) amounts to
~~ X;1V; CtiYi C O, ( I 2)
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for all x; that are not constants. These two properties derive from continuity
and strong quasi-concavity properties of the utility function.
A further property is not purely theoretical. If the preference ordering
can be represented by a utility function that is a sum of rt functions h;(q;),
then
E,; - wn,(s~~ - hlwi), (13)
with rp being the reciprocal of what Frisch terms "money Oexibility," and
b;; a Kronecker delta. Eqyation ( l3) states what is known as the ( complete)
~va~rt or prejerence independence property. The linear expenditure system
(LES), for instance, is characterized by such independence. Property (13) is
attractive in the sense that besides income elasticities q;, one necds only
one other magnitude, cp, to determine all Slutsky elasticities. This extreme
reduction in parameters corresponds to an extremely rigid representation
of interactions among goods in the preference order. Whcther this is
acceptable depends on the empirical context.
Apart from the homogeneity property, the constraints mentioned above
involve budget shares, which are in principle and in practice variable. The
constraints for constant elasticities cannot be applied to variable budget
shares. If one is only interested in saving degrees of freedom, one could
work with constant clasticities, using a singlc set of tiv; in the constraints.
That means, inter alia, that (2) is not respected for the explained q; except
for the sample point for which the selected w; are valid. It is clearly more
desirable to work with a parametrizalion that allows the use of constraints
without i~npairing the simulation properties of the demand equations.
13.3 Parametrization
The choice of constraints underlying the Rotterdam demand system can
be convcniently explained, starting from a double-logarithmic demand
function in differential form
dlnq; - p;dlnm -t ~ p;jdln p~, (14)
with tlic q; and the E~;; bcing, as bcforc, income and price elasticitics,
respcctively. Note that (l4) is not simply ( 1) in differcntial form unless q,
and t~;; arc constants.
An alternative version of (14) is obtained by using the Slutsky elasticitics
dcfincd in (8):
A. P. Barten: Levels Version of Rotterdam and Related Systems 445
rllnq; - r!;(dlnm -~ w;dlnp;) f~ e;;dlnp;.
i i
ln view of (2),
dlnm - ~ x;dlnq; -t- ~ w;dlnp;. (16)
i i
Writing
dlnQ - ~ x~dlnq;,
i




we have from (16)
dln m- dln Q t dln P. (Ig)
We may thcn also write ( I S) as
dlnq; - q;dlnQ t ~e;;dlnp;. (19)
;
The second term in (l9) represents the substitution effect of price changes,
with utility kept constant. The first term represents the change in demand
bccause of a change in utility. To see this, we make use of the second law
of Gosscn: c'u(q)~~3q; - i.p;, where u(q) is the utility function and 1. a(posi-
tivc) Lagrange multiplier. Then w; -(I~.lm)du(q)~aln q;, and
dIn Q -~ x; d!n q;
-(i.m) ~(aln qt)
dln 9j
- ~ .~~ du. (20)
in
Thc d I n Q variable can be seen as the change in the logarithm of real
income.
Thc Rottcrdam Spccification







~v;d lnq, - b;dlnQ t ~ s;jd lnpj. (23)
~
Note that the sum over i of the variable on the left-hand side is equal to
the log change in real income.
From (5) we have as an adding-up property,
~ b; - 1 (Engel aggregation), (24)
~
while the s;j satisfy
~ s;j - 0 (Slutsky aggregation),




s~ - sj; (symmctry), (27)
~~ x;s,;xj ~ 0 (negativity, x„ xj ~ constant), (28)
i j
s;; - ~pb;(S;j - bj) (prcference independence). (29)
All of these constraints are formulated in terms of constants only. The
two adding-up conditions ( 24) and (25) guarantee satisfaction of (17a) for
the dlnq;.
As follows from (21), the b, represent the (constant) marginal propensities
to consume since
b. - w. P;qr
aln 4i a9i a(P~qi)
~ - ~~~ - m dlnm - P~dm - am (30)
They are also called marginal budget shares in order to distinguish them
from the w;, the (average) budget shares. Constant b; mean linear Engcl
curvcs with convergence of the b; and the w; for increasing values of nt.
Negative b;, indicating inferior goods, are difficult to reconcile with this
type of asymptotic behavior. There are clearly limits to the validity of the
Rottcrdam spccification.
In the transition from differentials to time subscripted finite differences,




and a disturbance term (u;,) is added. Eventually, we may add an intercept
(c~;o) and other variables (Az„) representing shifts in demand caused by
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dctcrminants other than income and the prices. The final specífication is
~i~r~ Aln 9;~ - b; Aln Q, -~ ~ s;; Aln p;, -~ (aro f~ arkAZk~) f u;~, (32)j k
with
Dln Q, -~ iv;, Aln q;,. (33)
i
Given this definition and adding-up conditions (24) and ( 25), we have
tlic additional adding-up conditions
~ t'~~ - B. (34)
~ arr - 0, 1- 0, l, .... (35)
~
The CBS Spccification
Keller and van Driel (1985) propose a specification that treats the s;; of (22)
and thc
cr - ~~;(q; - 1) (36)
as constants, but not the b;. Their version-the CBS version-of (23) reads
~~;(dln y; - dln Q) - c; dln Q f~ s;;dln p;. (37)
;
Herc the c; satisfy the adding up condition
~ c; - 0 (38)
as can be readily verified.
The dependent variable in ( 37) is w; dln(q,~Q). Note that the sum of these
variablcs over i equals zero and that dln(q;~Q) basically is the deviation of
the relative change in q; from the average relative quantity change.
As is obvious from (36) and (21) c; - b, - w;, with the b; being the (now
variablc) marginal propensity to consume and w;, as before, the average
propensity to consume good i. A positive ci means b; ~ w, or an income
cl:tsticity larger than one ( i.e., i is a luxury good). A negative c; means that
q; is sm:tller than one(i is a necessity). In general, cr - r3w;~rjln m. A negative
value of c~; implies that for increasing m, w; turns negative, which is inadmis-
sible. For positive c;, w; may become larger than unity, which is also
inadmissible. lt is clear that the CBS specification ( and for the same rcason,
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the AIDS specification) cannot claim global validity, except for the trivial
case of c; - 0 for all i.
Another disadvantage of the CBS specification is that preference inde-
pendcnce cannot be spccified in terms of constants as in the Rotterdam case.
The CBS estimating equation in terms of first differences takes the form
w;, Aln ~9i~ - c; AIn Q, f~ s~ Aln p;, f(a,ó -1- ~ a; Az.,) f v~ , (39)
Q, i k
with additional adding-up properties similar to (34) and ( 35). Note that the
sum over i of the dependent variables equals uro.
The AIDS Specification
In their development of the almost ideal demand system (AIDS), Deaton
and Muellbaucr (1980) employ as constants the c; defined by (36) and the
r;~, which are defined as
r;~ - ~v;(e;~ t b;~ - w~) - sU t w;b;~ - w;w~. (40)
Using this expression to eliminate the s;~ from the right-hand sidc of (37),
we obtain with some rearrangement
tv;(dlny;-dlnQfdlnp,-dlnP)-c;dlnQf~r;~dlnp;, (41)
~
where dln P is defined as in (17b).
Thc variablc on the left-hand side is, in view of (l8),
~v;(dln y; f dln p; - dln m) - w; dln w;, (42)
which is the rclative change in the expcnditure share of good i multiplied
by thc expcnditure share of i itsclL Since
chv;
w; dln w; - w; ~ - dw;, (43)
` w;
this variablc is simply thc change in thc expcnditure share of good i.
It is easily verified from (40), (4) and from ( 25) through ( 27) that the r;~
satisfy
~ r;~ - 0 ( AIDS aggrcgation), (44)
~ r;~ - 0 ( homogencity), (45)
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r;j - rj; (symmctry). (46)
Thcre is no counterpart of the negativity condition (28) in terms ofconstant
parameters. It is also not possible to specify preference independence in
constants only.
It follows from (40) and (22) that the Slutsky elasticities e;; can be
expresscd in terms of the r;j and the (variable) w;, wj by
r;jE;; - - à;; t ~ ,. (4~)~,;
Transition to finite differences, addition of a disturbance term, and even-
tually an intcrcept and additional variables results in the AIDS estimating
cquation:
e~~'„ - c; eln Q, f~ r;j Aln pj, t(aó f~ akezk,) -~ u", (48)
j k
with the same types of additional adding-up properties as the other two
systems. As in the CBS system the dependent variables add up to zero.
A further qualification is in order. In their presentation of AIDS, Deaton
and Muellbauer use two alternatives to specify dln P. The first is consistent
with thc expenditure function on which their dcrivation of AIDS is based
and involves the r;j. The second is an approximation of that concept and
is the same as the one used here, namely, (17b). The main reason for using
it hcre is to have a systcm which is linear in the unknown coefficients and
which has also, as will become clear in the next subsection, the same
variablcs on thc right-hand side as in the two other systems.
A Class of Systcros
Note that :ts far as variables are concerned, the right-hand sides of the
demand equations of the three systems are basically equal. Since the
depcndent variables are dificrent, the coefficients on the right-hand side are
interpreted differently across these three systems.
A natural extension to a class of systems can be obtained by taking a
convcx combination of the dependent variables for each system:
(1 - u.)~i~,~elnq„ - o,~;;~elnQ, ~- o2ew,~
- d; eln Q, f~ t;j eln pj,(uó f~ u;ezk~) f u;;`. (49)
j 4
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with 0 5 0, S I, 0 S 02 S 1. For 0, - 02 - 0, we have the Rotterdam
system. For 0, - 1 and 02 - 0, the CBS system prevails, whereas 0, - 0 and
02 - I result in the A[DS. The cceliicients d, and t;; are related to the
cocfficients of the original systems by
d; - (1 - 0, - 02 )b; t (U, t 02 )c„ (50)
t;; - (I - U2)s;; -~ U2r;~. (51)
The propcrties of these coef(icients derive from those for the b;, c;, s;;, and
r;;. Note that
~ d; - (I - 0, - UZ) (52)
and that the negativity property dces not hold for tt; with 02 ~ 0.
It can bc shown that for increasing m, with 0 c l- U, - U~ S 1, the w;
tend to cl;~(1 - 0, - UZ), that is, to a constant as in the Rotterdam system.
Thc u,~, n;r, v;~ satisfy the usual adding up properties. We can express the
incomc clasticities as
q, - d; t (U, ~- Uz), (53)w;




(t can be verified that with symmetry and homogeneity imposed on the
cstimation of thc t;; thc elasticitics satisfy all propcrtics implicd by dcmand
thcory ( except negativity for U2 ~ 0), even for values of 0, and U2 outside
thc [0, 1] interval.
The appcal of (49) is that it can leave somcwhat more to bc dctermincd
by data than would be the case for each of thc constituent "clemcntary"
systcros whilc remaining consistcnt with thcory.
13.a Levels Version
In thc prcccding scction wc discusscd parametrizatíon in thc contcxt of a
system in terms of log changes in the system's variables. This context,
however, is accidental. What matters is the way in which the elasticities are
transformcd into constants that satisfy theorctical constraints.
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The same approach will be taken to arrive at corresponding levels
versions. We will start with a variant of the double-logarithmic dcmand
function ( I), namcly,
In q; - x; f q; In Q' ~- ~ e;~ In pj, (55)
i
whcre In Q' is a real income variable which we will defíne later. The e;; are
Slutsky elasticities, which were dcfined by (8).
Multiplying both sides of (55) by w; and using Rotterdam specifications
(21) and (22), we obtain
~~; In q; - a;o f b; In Q' f~ s;j In p;,
;
(56)
with properties ( 24) through ( 29) for the b; and s;j. The a;o is an additional
intcrccpt.
Given adding-up properties ( 24) and (25), we may write
~~r; In q; -~ a~o f In Q', l57)
which in fact defines In Q'. Using this definition in (56), we can write
~c; ln q, -( a;o - b; ~ a~o) f b; ~ wj ln q j-f- ~ s;~ ln pj. (58)
i 1 i
With
u;~ - a;o - h; ~ a,o
:
and
In Q - ~ ~~; In q;,
dcmand cquation (58) can be reformulated as
n;lnq; - a;o t b;InQ t~s;~lnp;.
i
lt follows from ( 59) that






Clcarly, In Q is a logarithmic quantity index number and thus a natural
mcasure for real income. Its price counterpart is defined as
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ln P -~ w; In p;. (63)
We can'verify that:
In m- In Q t In P- In W, (64)
with
In W-~ wj ln wf (65)
which contrasts with ( l8), the corresponding relation for differentials. Here
the factor-reversal test is not satisfied. The usual interpretation of real
income as detlated nominal income (in this case m~P) dces not correspond
to this treatment of Q. Note, however, that the (logarithmic) difference In W
is usually nearly a constant. Its terms, w,lnw,, are less variable than w;,
which itseltis only variable insofar as preferences are not homothetic. Their
sum is at most zero and at least -In n. with n being the number of goods
considcred.
However, replacing ln Q by In(m~P) in (61) is not desirable. The adding-
up condition will not be satisfied by the full system. There is morcover, no
particular reason to prefer In(m~P) as the real income indicator over In Q.
The latter has the advantage of being a quantity concept, and thus a real
magnitude.
Expression (b l) is proposed as the Ievels version of the Rotterdam system.
To it, of course, disturbance terms and eventually other demand dcter-
minants are added. To obtain the levels version of the CBS system, we
simply replace b; in (bl) by c, f w,. The result is
w; In ~Q~ - aó t c; In Q t~ s;; (n p;. (66)
i
On the Ieft-hand side, we have q;~Q. Here Q can also be seen as a weightcd
gcomctric averagc of thc quantities. So q;~Q is the ratio ofy; to the averagc
of thc q;'s. Note that the sum of the variables on the Icft-hand side equals
zcro. Thc intercepts will also add up to zcro.
Substituting (40) for s;~ in (66) givcs the counterpart of (41):
rr~;(Iny;-InQtlnp;-InP)-aátc;InQt~r;;lnp;. (67)
;
Tlie variablc on the Icft-hand side can also be writtcn as
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w;
~~;(In w; - In W) - t~; In W. (68)
We have here the ratio of w; to the ( weighted geometric) average of the
budgct shares. Since x~;~W -(p;q;)~(PQ), we may also say that it is the ratio
of expenditure on i to the ( weighted geometric) average of expenditures.
Note also that (68) adds up to zero as does the intercept in (67).
Expression ( 67) can be considered the natural levels counterpart of the
AIDS first difference equations. However, the A[DS equations of Deaton
and Mucllbauer's original proposal are formulated differcntly. Their levels
analogue of(41) is
~~; - ~ë -~ c; In Q t~ r;; In p;, (69)
~
with the constants aó adding up to one. In fact, as we have already
mcntioned when presenting the first differences version of AIDS, Deaton
and Muellbaucr use m~P' rather than Q, where P' is either a price index
involving the r;; or P as defined by (63). Here the use of Q instead ofdeflated
income is motivated by the desire to have the right-hand side the same as
in the other systems. We will therefore consider (69) as our levels version
of AIDS. To avoid confusion, equation ( 67) is taken to represent a separate
system, which we will call the W-system.
Dy construction, the four systems just presented have the same variables
on their right-hand sides. Convex combinations oftheir left-hand sides then
also constitute dcmand systems in levels.
13.5 Altcrnative Approaches
Another way to dcrive levels counterparts for the Rotterdam and CBS
systems would be to start from AIDS specification (69). Replacing r;; by the




whcre now thc variable on the left-hand side and the intercepts add up to
onc. The dcpendcnt variable can also be written as
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w;~l f In~Q I- In~~W~~
which makes it more comparable to the left-hand variable o[(66).
Next, replacing the c; in (70) by b; - wj gives an alternative Rotterdam-
type cquation:
tiv;~l -Inlp~tlnQ1-oófb;InQf~s;jlnp~. (72)
` ` l ;
Its dependent variable is equal to
n; I I t In q; - ln ~W~~, (73)
wh`ich sums up to` 1 t ln Q. Note that also in this case the intercepts aó
add up to one.
The presence of 1 - ln(w;~W) in both dependent variablcs (?I) and (73)
make these alternatives less intuitively plausible. Still, similarity of the
right-hand sides of (70) and (72) with those of the systems of the prcvious
section suggests that the class of systems considered there may be extended
further. However, we will not discuss them further here.
Another approach to defining cross-sectional demand systems has been
explorcd by Theil (1983). He basically uses the first differences approach.
The variables are taken as first dif(erences from one of the observation units.
The various systems could be rather easily converted into proper levels
vcrsions wcre it not that iv;~ appcars in In Q~ -~; w;~(In q;~ - In q;,) and
in the dependent variables of the Rotterdam and CBS systcros. Here s refcrs
to thc obscrvation unit used as the standard from which the differcnces are
taken and c refers to the unit described. Thus iv;~ -(w;~ t w;,)~2. We
cannot simply write thc differences as differences betwcen two tcrms of
which one is constant across c. The estimation results will generally depend
on the observation unit used as standard. It is not elear which unit should
be taken as standard.
In such a system we could of course replace Aln Q~ by In Q~ - In Q, with
In Q~ -~; ~v;~ In q;~ as in (60). Likewise, we could replace the left-hand side
variable of the Rotterdam systcm by w;,.ln q~ - w;, In q;, and that of the
CBS system by w;~ In (q;~~Q~) - w;, In(qu~Q,). Reordcring of tcrms brings
us back to the levels version of the previous section with somewhat more
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elaborate intercepts. The results will not depend on the unit used as
standard. In fact there is no need to single out any unit for that purpose.
If we can use the original Theil approach to choose one unit as the
standard one, we have another set of three demand systems with mutually
related parametrizations. Their right-hand sides contain the same vari-
ablcs. However, these are not the same as those of the level versions of
section 13.4.
13.6 Simulation
By estimating demand systems, we obtain information about coefficients,
elasticities, or partial derivatives. The final use of demand systems is to
provide in(ormation about the quantities demanded. Given m and the
prices, knowledge of the budget shares is equivalent. The left-hand sides of
thc Rotterdam and CBS specifications are not simple functions of the
quantitics and~or budget shares. Their derivation from the calculated
valucs of the right-hand sides deserves some discussion in view of the
possibility ofcomparing their ability to correctly simulate the actual quan-
tities or budget shares. In this context simulation dces not refer to the use
of artificial random data generátion processes.
The case of AIDS seems to create few problems. The IeR-hand variable
of its levels version is the budget share itself. Assuming that the prices are
exogenously given, there are two possible simulations: with Q given and m
not, and the reverse of this. If Q is given, the w; are easily calculated for
givcn values of the coe(Ticients in (69). To solve for Q, however, we necd m.
Thís variable is endogenously determined by (64) by using the calculated
~v; ~ts wcights in (63) and (65). To apply (69) when m rather than Q is givcn,
we proceed first by calculating Q, for which (64) can also be employed.
Now, tlie w; ncedcd Cor (63) and (65) are not available. An iterative solution
procedurc is needed, starting from provisional values for w;, ealculating
In Q, applying (69) to obtain new values for w;, which serve as the starting
values for the new round. This sequence is repeated until successive changes
in w; become smaller in absolute value than some specified minimum.
Usually a few iterations are sufGcient for this purpose.
Simulation of budget shares and quantities dcmanded for AIDS in first
diffcrences does not create any additional problems. Note that there is no
guarantec that simulated ~v; stay within the interval between zero and one.
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They will add up to one, but some w; may be negative and others larger
than unity.
Simulating with Rotterdam system (61) requires further treatment of the
left-hand side variable w; In q,. We will first transform it into an expression
in tv;:
w; In q, - w,(In wt - In p, f In m) - w,(In w, -~- z,), (74)
with z, - In m - In p,. Let y; be the calculated value of the right-hand side
of (61). We then look for the w, that solves
w;(In w; f z;) - y~. (75)
Such a solution might not exist. The left-hand side reaches for w; -
exp(- I- z,), its minimum of -exp(-1 - z,). If y, is less than this value,'
there is no solution to (75). If y, is larger, there are two solutions: one larger
than cxp(-1 - z,), and the other smaller. The latter will always be non-
negative; the larger may be greater than unity and hence be inadmissible.
If there are two admissible solutions, a choice has to be made. Often one
of the two solutions is rather improbable, leaving one acceptable solution.
This, however, cannot be guaranteed in general.
A furthcr aspect of simulation with (61) is similar to the one discussed
for AIDS. If Q is given rather than m, there is no problem in obtaining y,,
but we need to calculate m to arrive at z;. Therefore an iterative procedure
is necded. If nt is given rather than Q, the reverse happens: z; can be readily
found, but to obtain y,, we need to calculate Q first, for which w, are necded.
Here also an iterative solution procedure has to be used.
From the point of view of simulation, Rotterdam variant ( 72) has a
simplcr Ieft-hand sidc variable. There are no multiple solutions. Itcration
is necded to detcrmine P and, if m is given, to determine Q. Solutions for
w, outside the 0-1 interval may occur.
The possibility of no solution or a two-valued solution also arises in the
case of the Rotterdam system in first differences. The situation is slightly
different from that of (75) because the equation to be solved is
iv~~hn ~~;~ f z~~) - 1't~, (76)
with w;, on the left-hand side. Here z;, - In m, - ln p„ - In q;,,-,, whereas
y;, is calculated from the right-hand side of ( 32) by setting ~„ - 0. The
simulation can be made more straightforward when in (76) if w„ is replaced
by prcdetermined w;,,-,.
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Similar problems and possibilities exist for the various versions of the
CBS system.
From the discussion of determining m if Q is given, it is clear ihat m is
the expenditure needed to pay for the optimal bundle given Q. It is the
left-hand side variable of the expenditure function. By simulating with
varying prices and constant Q, we can numerically generate price index
numbcrs as thc ratios of the m's needed to obtain In Q in the two price
systems.
13.7 Comparing Empirical Performance
Dcmand systems are tools for the empirical analysis of consumer behavior.
To compare their empirical performance seems natural. However, it is not
possible to draw general conclusions from the results for a particular
sample or a set of samples. Still, some experimentation can be informative.
Our experiments will involve only the levels versions (61), (66), and (69)
of the Rotterdam system, the CBS system, and AIDS, respectively. The
comparison should shed some light on the relative merits of the particular
parametrizations. The matrix of price coefGcients s~~ of the Rotterdam and
CBS systems will be estimated without imposing negativity condition (28)
to maintain comparability with AIDS where such a condition cannot be
implemcntcd.
The Data
The three systems are estimatcd for a cross section of 34 countries in 1975.
The U.N. International Comparison Project (ICP) has collected price and
quantity data for ISl categories of consumer demand, which have been
published by Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1982). The countries of the
sample range from (poor, e.g., Malawi) to rich (e.g., the United States). Their
pricc systems show considerable variation. These data seem well suited to
tests of empirical performance.
For our purpose the 15l categories of consumer demand are more than
is neccssary. We have aggregated them into eight major groups. One of
thcse is food. Its budget share ranges from 68 percent for Sri Lanka to 16
percent for the United Statcs-an indication of the wide range ofvariability
in this data set.
It is obvious that the differences in demand behavior across this set of
countries have to be attributed to more than differences in prosperity and
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price structure. One source of di(Terence is that of climate; another is that
of the age composition of the population. Altogether six additional vari-
ables, taken from Barten and Summers (1986), have been used to account
for other determinants of demand than average income and prices. They
are mean annual temperature, the average temperature of the coldest
month, the average temperature of the warmest month, the percentage of
children undcr 15 years of age, the Gini index of inequality of the income
distribution, and the logarithm of the population size. Note that the 1CP
is already expressed in per capita terms. Population size as an additional
variable includes possible economies of scale. These six variables are sc-
Iected from a class o[ twelve. The desire not to waste degrees of freedom
limited their number to six.
There arc many reasons why any demand system would be inadcquate
to dcscribe the variation in behavior across countries. Demand systems
reflect characteristics of individual consumer demand, whereas the data
refer to countries in the aggregate. In spite of the enormous effort of the
ICP to arrive at comparable data, there is still much disparity. The addi-
tional variables are perhaps also not representative enough to absorb
explainable variation across countries. The omitted variables could be
correlated with the income and price variables causing biases in ecefficient
estimators. More reasons for the inadequacy in describing behavior can be
advanced. Still it is interesting to find out the extent to which the data agree
with thc proposed modcls.
Thc Cocfficicnts of Dctcrmination
The DEMMOD computer program has been used to estimate systems of
dcmand cquations by maximum likelihood procedures as described in
Bártcn (1969) and Bartcn and Geyskens (1975). This program calculates
the R2 for cach commodity group. But all equations are estimated jointly,
and the RZ's arc not maximizcd. Still, they may serve as a simple mcasurc
of relative fit (see table 13.1). A simple inspection of the RZ's in table 13.1
shows that CBS scores best, followed by Rotterdam, with AIDS being the
weakest.
Information Inaccuracy
One could argue that the RZ's are not really comparable across the three
systems because the left-hand side variables differ. One way to test com-
parability is to let the estimated version of each system generate budget
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Tablc 13.1




I. Food 0.811 0.829 0.892
2. Clothing and footwear 0.726 0.910 0.656
3. Housing and fuel 0.699 0.723 0.575
4. Huusehold furnishings and opcrations 0.788 0.890 0.698
S. Mcdical care 0.904 0.892 0.890
6. Transport and communications 0.824 0.898 0.689
7. Education 0.507 0.748 0.566
8. Rcmainder 0.809 0.789 0.687
Table 13.2
Avcragc information accuracy




sli~tres (see the preceding section) and then to compare the simulated budget
shares with tlie actual ones.
A useful aggregate measure of the divergence between observed and
prcdicted budgct shares is Theil's (1967) concept of information inaccuracy,
which is defined as
1~ -~ w;~(In w;~ - In t'v;~), (77)
where tv;~ refers to thc observed and t'v;~ to the calculated budgct shares for
commodity i and country c. For our purpose we will use the avertgc
information inaccuracy:
~~ I~1 - 34 . (78)
The results are given in table 13.2.
A lower value for 1 means better performance. From table I 3.2 it is clear
that AI DS dominates the other two systems. The CI3S system is particularly
wcak. Calculating predicted shares for AIDS did not cause any problems.
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For the Rotterdam and CBS systems. the work was less simple. The
simulation failed to converge for at least one country using the Rotterdam
system and for no less than thirteen countries using the CBS systcm.
Omitting these countries from the calculation of 1 gives the results of the
last column of table 13.2. The picture has not changed drastically.
It is not clcar whether this remaining divergence in predictive behavior
is due to shortcomings in the simulation procedure, or to the fact that
prcdicting w;~ is just what AIDS is optimizing, or even to the superiority of
the A1DS paramcterization for this type of data.
Incomc and Price Elasticities
Another way to compare the three systems is to evaluate the implied income
and pricc elasticities to sce to what extent they correspond to theorctical
and intuitive prior ideas. For all three system, the elasticities arc not
cstimated as such but they can be calculated from the estimated cocfGcients
and thc budgct shares for a particular country. In this case the elasticitics
are evaluated for Italy bccause its budget shares correspond closely to the
avcrage elasticities for the whole sample.
In tablc 13.3 are listed the valucs of the elasticity of demand for a
commodity with respcct to Q, the "income" elasticity, and in table 13.4 the
Table 13.3




1. food 0.38 0.81 0.86
(0.59) (0.11) (0.09)
2. Clolhing and kiotwcar 0.85 1.10 0.99
(0.71) (0.06) (0. I I )
3. Housing and fucl 2.46 1.27 1.24
(0.92) (0.14) (0.14)
4. Houschold furnizhings and opcrations 1.97 0.96 1.18
(1.03) 10.12) (0.171
5. Mcdical Care 1.35 1.04 1.12
10.60) (0.08) 10.08)
6. Tr.tnstxirt and communications L85 1.21 I.U
10.70) 10.08) (0.12)
7. [duc:ition -0.63 0.74 0.71
(1.06) (0.17) (0.16)
8. Rcmrindcr 0.81 1.14 1.02
(0.88) (0.13) (0.13)
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values of the Slutsky elasticity of demand for a commodity with respect to
its own price. In parentheses under the elasticity values arc the standard
errors.
Form table 13.3 it appears that the income elasticities for CBS and AIDS
are rather similar, as one would expect of the same type of parametrization
for the effect of real income. Also the standard errors are roughly equal.
All of the elasticities turn out to be close to unity. This retlects the fact that
the underlying c; are close to zero.
As indicated in section 13.3, the nonzero c; cause problems for asymptotic
behavior. With zero c;, such problems are avoided. The present sample
with its wide variation in Q(Qm„~Qm;,, - 12.6) seems to force the c; toward
zero.
Zero c; suggest linear Engel curves. The Rotterdam system should agree
with that. The results of table 13.3 are not in accordance with this expecta-
tion. There is a substantial and unusual varíation in the Rotterdam income
elasticities, which is suspicious. Moreover the standard errors are fairly
large. The Rotterdam specification does not seem to adjust very gracefully
to the wide variation in Q and in the budget share of this particular sample.
Thc inadequate performance of the Rotterdam system reveals itself also
in the estimated values of the own Slutsky elasticities. Only three out of
TYble 13.4




I. Food 2.67 -0.19 -0.18
(0.95) (0.09) (O.IS)
?. Cluthing and footwcrr -2.04 -0.93 - t.06
(0.92) (0.08) (0.07)
3. Nuusing and fucl 1.65 -0.38 -O.SI
(0.87) (0.12) (0.13)
J. liuuschold furnishings and operations -2.14 - 1.07 - 1.19
(1.25) (0.17) (0.21)
5. Mcdicrl Carc 2.44 -0.34 -0.44
(O.S6) (0.08) (0.07)
6. Tr:~nsport and communications I.99 -0.62 -0.46
(0.91) (0.11) (0.07)
7. Education 0.49 -0.78 -0.70
(0.77) (O.13) (0. I 1)




the eight elasticities have the theoretically expected negative sign. The two
othcr systcros have no problem with the negativity of the own Slutsky
elasticity. Here also the Rotterdam elasticities are large in absolute value,
like the corresponding standard errors.
Despite the di(Terent parametrizations of price coe(licients for CBS and
AfDS, the implied elasticity valucs for Italy are rather closc. They arc
roughly comparable in size to what one usually obtains for such elasticities
for highly aggregate commodity groups with few, if any, close substitutes.
The difference between the Rotterdam and the CBS Slutsky elasticities
is then even more surprising since they are based on the same parametriza-
tion. The difference in the specification of the effect of real income appears
to be dominating.
A Morc Formal Tcst
The comparisons discussed so far have been descriptive. It is not easy to
assess the statistical significance of difTerences in performances. Note that
the systems considered are not nested. The well-established theory ofmodcl
selection when the various alternatives are nested cannot be applied.
Thc present sct of systems distinguishes itself from the usual context of
nonnested model selection by having the samc right-hand sides. This
property can be convcniently exploited.
Considcr, for example, the following linear combination of the Rot-
terdam and CBS dependent variables:
( I- 0)tie~~ ln q,~ f Ow;~ In ~Qf I (79)
For a given value of 0, we calln estimatc the coc(Ticients on the right-hand
side in the usual way and obtain a(maximum) likelihood value. Clearly,
for 0- 0, we have the maximum likelihood value for the Rotterdam system,
and for 0- 1, the maximum likclihood value for the CBS system.
We rtn, of course, also estimate 0 itself by maximum likelihood proce-
dures. Under either hypothesis it will bc a consistent estímator of 0 or 1,
respcctivcly. The grcater proximity to onc of thcse values in finite samples
is then sccn as a rcjcction of the empirical validity of the other.
In the present case 0 was estimated by maximizing the likelihood func-
tion concentrated on ll only. The square root of the reciprocal of the
sccond-order derivative of the quadratic approximation evaluated at the
maximizing value for 0 serves as its standard error.
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Tabk 13.5
Logarithmic likelihood values and test stalistics
Rotterdrm,~CBS Rotterdam~AlDS CDS~AIDS
U In L 0 In L 0 In L
0 245 0 245 0 742
1 742 1 683 1 683
1.14 818 1.18 1062 0.21 751
(0.011 (0.00) (0-01)
The same approach can be used for the pairwise comparison between
the Rotterdam system and AIDS and between the CBS system and AIDS.
Note that this test is symmetric for the two alternatives in each pair-that
is, replacing 0 by 1- t; in (79) will simply reverse the roles of the two
alternatives, but the optimizing ~ will be one minus the optimizing [7.
The results for the optimizing t7 values are given in table t3.5, together
with (in parentheses) their standard errors and the corresponding loga-
rithmic likelihood values. To complete the picture, the logarithmic likeli-
hood values for the elementary systems are given as well.
From the table 13.5 it is obvious that the Rotterdam system is dominated
by both the CBS system and AIDS. The optimizing U values are in both
comparisons closer to one than to zero. The small standard errors re(lect
thc sharp peak in the likelihood function at the relevant point. (They may
overstate the small sample precision of the optimizing 0 values.) The 0.21
valuc for 0 in the CBS~AIDS comparison may be interpreted as a rejection
of AIDS.
We might argue that the substantial increases in the likelihoods when 0
is estimated suggests the rejcction of all three systems in favor of somc
hybrid system. It might very well be that each systcm is too rigid in its
paramctrization and that some simple relaxation may improve the empiri-
cal performance drastically. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to
investigate this approach further.
A Final Evaluation
The various comparisons of the three systems have not created an entirely
clcar picture. The Rotterdam system appears to be the Ieast satisfactory as
far as coe(rcients estimates and likelihood value are concerned. The CBS
systcm does not fare well in simulation. The RZ's of AIDS are relatively
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weak. Still, apart from the simulation problcm, CBS seems to be bcst. AIDS
is a close runner-up. The specification of the effect of real income appears
to be crucial.
As mcntioned at the beginning of this section, thesc conclusions are
spccific for the data set used and do not necessarily carry over to an
application of levels versions to, for instance, time scries data.
13.8 Concluding Remarks
We started with specifications for the Rotterdam, CBS, and almost idcal
demand systems for first differences in the logarithm of the relevant vari-
ables and derived analogous systems for the levels of the logarithms oCthose
variablcs. In each systcm the right-hand side was the samc but not the
Icft-hand side. Nevertheless, even with the same coefficients, more than one
variant could be used on the left-hand sides.
The Rotterdam parametrization uses constant marginal budget shares
and constant price coefficients that are simple transformations of the
Slutsky elasticities and therefore easy to interpret. The price coefficients of
A1 DS are less convenient in that respect. AIDS takes the difference between
the marginal and averagc budget shares as constant. The CBS system uscs
the same type of income coefficients as AIDS and the Rotterdam type of
pricc cocfficients.
The constant marginal budget shares used in the Rotterdam system
imply constant average shares for high budget levels. Similarly, keeping the
diffcrcnce bctween the marginal and average budget shares constant (AIDS
and CBS) is only possible for high budget levels if this difference is zero.
Gqual marginal and average budget shares mcans that both are constant.
In this respcct the thrce systems are less di(1'erent than appears on first sight.
Thc 1975 ICP cross scction of 34 countrics displays considcrable varia-
tion in the variables. It has a wide ( real) income range and widely varying
budgct shares. Bccause the variations in budget shares cannot be attributcd
to diffcrcnccs in pricc structures and dctcrminants othcr than ( rcal) incomc,
onc might expect all three systems not to describc thesc data well. But it
appcars that the CBS specification has hardly any problem with this. Its
implied values for income elasticities are close to one, however, suggesting
indepcndence of the budgct shares from income. For AIDS a similar
conclusion can be made. The Rotterdam specification seems to agree Iess
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well with these data. This is no doubt due to the use of constant marginal
budget shares.
The development of the various systems has also introduccd hybrid
forms-linear (convex) combinations of the undcrlying elementary systcros.
These might offer better adjustment to the data, although somewhat less
suitable interpretation of the results. Nowever, as our experiments indicate,
there is still room for improvement of the empirical performance of the
various elementary systems.
Notc
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